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Abstract
In this paper I try to shed some light on how one discerns a physical effect or phenomenon
from experimental background ‘noise’. To this end I revisit the discovery of Weak Neutral
Currents (WNC), which has been right at the centre of discussion of some of the most
influential available literature on this issue. Bogen and Woodward (1988) have claimed that
the phenomenon of WNC was inferred from the data without higher level physical theory
explaining this phenomenon (here: the Weinberg-Salam model of electroweak interactions)
being involved in this process. Mayo (1994, 1996), in a similar vein, holds that the discovery
of WNC was made on the basis of some piecemeal statistical techniques—again without the
Salam-Weinberg model (predicting and explaining WNC) being involved in the process. Both
Bogen & Woodward and Mayo have tried to back up their claims by referring to the historical
work about the discovery of WNC by Galison (1983, 1987). Galison’s presentation of the
historical facts, which can be described as realist, has however been challenged by Pickering
(1984, 1988, 1989), who has drawn sociological-relativist conclusions from this historical
case. Pickering’s conclusions, in turn, have recently come under attack by Miller and Bullock
(1994), who delivered a defence of Galison’s realist account. In this paper I consider all of
these historical studies in order to evaluate the philosophical claims that have been made on
the basis of them. I conclude that—contrary to Bogen & Woodward (1988) and Mayo
(1994)—statistical methods and other experimental inference procedures from the “bottom-
up” (i.e. from the data to the phenomena) were insufficient for discerning WNC from their
background noise. I also challenge Galison’s notion of the “end of experiments” and shall
take the wind out of the sail of Miller and Bullock’s attack on some of Pickering’s claims,
whilst rejecting Pickering’s sociological-relativist conclusions. Instead, I claim that an
epistemic warrant from the ‘top down’ in the form of a theoretical postulate of the Weinberg-
Salam model was necessary for “ending the experiments”, i.e. for the acceptance of WNC as a
genuine phenomenon in the scientific community.
Keywords: Weak Neutral Currents, experimental noise, discovery, phenomena, data, statistics
21 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 2
2 PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNTS OF EFFECT-NOISE DISCRIMINATION ................... 5
2.1 Bogen and Woodward’s Bottom-up Construction of Phenomena .....................5
2.2 Mayo’s statistical error account .........................................................................6
3 WEAK NEUTRAL CURRENTS AND STATISTICAL INFERENCES TOWARDS
THEM .............................................................................................................. 8
3.1 It’s Not All about Statistics ..............................................................................12
4 WEAK NEUTRAL CURRENT EXPERIMENTS IN THE 1960S .............................. 15
4.1 The 1960s Spark Chamber Experiments by the HPWF Group........................16
4.2 Pre-Gargamelle Bubble Chamber Experiments at CERN................................18
4.2.1 Disregarded Evidence for Neutral Current Events in the 1960s..................20
4.3 Upper Limits, Inclusive vs. Exclusive Currents, and Energy Cuts ..................22
5 THE ARGUMENT FROM SPATIAL DISTRIBUTIONS .......................................... 25
5.1 The Monte Carlo Calculations of Neutron Background ..................................29
6 HOW DO EXPERIMENTS END?....................................................................... 31
7 EPISTEMIC WARRANT FROM TOP-DOWN ...................................................... 36
8 CONCLUSION................................................................................................. 40
9 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................. 43
What do we learn from studying the past?
Answer: If we don’t have the right theoretical
prejudice, progress in experimental physics is
likely to be very slow.—Sakurai (1978) on the
discovery of weak neutral currents.
1 INTRODUCTION
How do scientists discern a physical effect or phenomena from noise? Which sorts of
techniques and what sort of arguments do they use in this process? Under which
conditions can scientists be certain that a particular effect or phenomenon is not an
artefact but rather genuine? Trying to find answers to these questions should be a
prior concern for philosophers of science. After all, we usually think that science is
privileged as an epistemological enterprise in discovering the furniture of the world.
Distinguishing effects or phenomena 1 from ‘unimportant’ background noise and
‘intervening factors’, which potentially mask ‘genuine’ effects, should be pivotal for
any discovery claim. Therefore, clarifying this problem should have hugely important
ramifications for philosophical notions of theory testing, inference procedures like the
1 In this paper shall use the terms “physical effect” and “phenomena” interchangeably.
3Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), and last but not least for the all prevailing
realism/antirealism debate. If we cannot be sure about the genuineness of a particular
effect, how should we be able to test a theory that predicts that effect? How can we
infer the causes of those effects, if we cannot be sure that the effects at hand are not
genuine ones but rather vitiated by other effects? How can science be approximating
the truth if there are no objective procedures for discerning and establishing genuine
effects that form the backbone for scientific progress?
Despite the importance of finding out how scientists discern genuine physical
effects from noise this problem has only fairly recently received attention from
philosophers of science. The emergence of so-called New Experimentalism2 in the
1980s has been very formative in this respect. Although many of the claims I am
going to make in this paper may be read as a critique of New Experimentalism, I want
to concentrate on those philosophical and historical accounts of the establishment of
physical effects that have made the discovery of WNC the subject of their discussions
(which happen to be show great sympathy towards New Experimentalism)3. Galison
(1983, 1987) has tried to address this problem in the form of historical case studies,
most notably, in his study of the discovery of weak neutral currents (WNC). Being a
historian, Galison is often not very explicit on the philosophical views which underlie
his histories. All the more explicit are Bogen and Woodward (1988) and Mayo (1994,
1996), who have used the discovery of WNC in order to support their philosophical
accounts of effect-noise discrimination. Bogen and Woodward have argued for what
one may call a “bottom-up” construction of phenomena from data, whereas Mayo
2 The term New Experimentalism was coined by Ackermann (1989) and refers to a movement
that puts strong emphasis on the experimental aspects of science as being to some degree
autonomous from theoretical science and, amongst other things, capable of establishing the
reality of phenomena and even theoretical entities. Ian Hacking, Peter Galison, Allan
Franklin, and Nancy Cartwright are often mentioned as the main proponents of New
Experimentalism. Hacking (1983) is usually said to have originated this movement, the
upshot of which is often illustrated with Hacking’s dictum “Experiments have a life of their
own independent of theory”. See Mayo (1994) for three interpretations of this slogan.
3 This (and the fact that I do not want to blow this paper out of proportion) is why I shall not
explicitly discuss Allan Franklin’s “epistemological strategies” in this paper, which he claims
are vital for establishing physical effects and for ruling out artefacts. However, since I shall
argue against the “bottom-up” construction of scientific phenomena (see main text), and since
all of Franklin’s epistemological strategies are experimental in nature, I take it that Franklin’s
4tried to give credence to her “error statistical” (also: “severe testing”) approach.
Bogen and Woodward, and Mayo have all largely relied on Galison’s account which
however has not remained unchallenged. Pickering (1983, 1984, 1989) has criticised
Galison’s realist construal of the discovery of WNC and has argued for sociological-
relativist conclusions. Pickering, in turn, has been attacked by Miller and Bullock
(1994) who have defended Galison’s realist account of the discovery. In this paper I
want to reconsider the historical details of the discovery of WNC in order to critically
assess the philosophical claims that have been made with them. To this end, I will
first of all introduce Bogen and Woodward’s, and Mayo’s general philosophical
accounts of effect-noise discrimination in Section 2 and Mayo’s particular construal
of the discovery of WNC in Section 3 in terms of statistical arguments. Based on the
historical material, I shall then present a critique of all those philosophical accounts
(in particular Mayo’s and to some extent Bogen and Woodward’s) which have
assigned an essential role to statistical arguments in the discovery of WNC (Section
3). This I shall do by drawing attention to aspects of the experimental methods and
evidence which are inherently unsusceptible to statistical arguments but which were
nevertheless crucial in the discovery of WNC. In Section 4 shall also support a point
made by Pickering according to which (i) the experimental apparatus in the 1960s was
already capable of detecting WNC and (ii) the data obtained with this apparatus
already indicated a WNC signal but was not recognised or assigned major importance
to by the experimentalists. In Section 5 I shall discuss an argument which dealt on the
expected spatial distribution of WNC events in so-called “bubble chambers”. This
argument has been cited by Miller and Bullock (1994) as a reason why the 1960s
chambers could not in principle have discovered WNC. Based on the historical
evidence and the problem of neutron cascades in particular, I shall refute this claim
and work out the all the more critical role of the neutron background estimates
provided by the Monte Carlo simulations. In Section 6 I shall finally criticise
Galison’s notion of the “end of experiments” and I shall argue instead for the
establishment of WNC through an epistemic warrant from “top-down”, which I take
to be incompatible with Bogen and Woodward’s construal of the establishment of
strategies can be subjected to similar criticism. For descent explicit criticism, see Pickering
(1990), Rasmussen (1993) and the various responses it has provoked (see Rasmussen 2001).
5phenomena in particular. I shall conclude this paper by making an argument of the
generalisabilty of the present case.
2 PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNTS OF EFFECT-NOISE DISCRIMINATION
2.1 Bogen and Woodward’s Bottom-up Construction of
Phenomena
Where philosophers had long been talking about the relationship between theories and
observations, Bogen and Woodward (1988) notoriously introduced the “third level” of
phenomena and characterised them by contrasting them to traditional observable data.
Whereas data ‘cannot be predicted or systematically explained by theory’,
phenomena, being ‘inferred from the data’, can be predicted and explained, ‘but in
most cases are not observable in any interesting sense of the term’ (pp. 305-6). The
inference of phenomena from data is a one-way road:
The direction of inference in such cases is “upwards” from the data to some
feature of the phenomenon, rather than “downwards” from the phenomenon
to features of the data” (Woodward 2000, p. S164)
In other words, the phenomena are constructed from the bottom-up from the data
without the theory having any word in this construction process (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 Bogen and Woodward’s data/phenomena/theory trichotomy. From Schindler (2007),
modified.
Furthermore, whereas data are ‘idiosyncratic to particular experimental contexts, and
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6idiosyncratic to specific experimental contexts. We expect phenomena to have stable,
repeatable characteristics which will be detectable by means of a variety of different
procedures’ (p. 317). These procedures have to make sure that the data, which serve
as the basis for the inference of phenomena, are reliable.
[T]he question of whether data constitute reliable evidence for some
phenomena turns (among other things) on such considerations as whether the
data are replicable, whether various confounding factors and other sources of
possible systematic error have been adequately controlled, on statistical
arguments of various kinds, and on one’s procedures for the analysis and
reduction of data. (p. 327)
A point which Bogen and Woodward emphasise very strongly is that the reliability of
the data can be established without higher order theory explaining why particular data
happen to pop out of one’s experimental apparatus. On the contrary,
Explanations of the data, to the extent they can be given at all, will lack
generality and will be closely tailored to individual cases; they often will be
enormously complex, and will rely heavily on ad hoc or after the fact
assumptions. (Woodward 1989, p. 401)
Although Bogen and Woodward are less explicit about this point, it is also clear from
their discussion that the piecemeal procedures for establishing the reliability of the
data (reduction of data, data analysis, ruling out confounding factors, control of errors,
etc.) are entirely independent of the predictions and explanations the tested theory
makes about the phenomena. It is here where I disagree with Bogen and Woodward.
Before I shall articulate my disagreement in the case of the discovery of WNC, I want
to consider another philosophical account that has made heavy use of the discovery of
WNC.
2.2 Mayo’s statistical error account
Mayo has argued that although the New Experimentalists ‘are right to insist on the
tasks of distinguishing and subtracting out backgrounds, quite apart from the aim of
testing high-level theories’ (which I take to be very much consistent with Bogen and
Woodward’s account discussed above), ‘something more general is needed to
understand how experimental practices accomplish these tasks’ (Mayo 1994, p. 277).
Mayo contends that her so-called “error statistical account” does the trick and that it is
standard error statistical tools that are capable of ‘discriminating signals from noise,
ruling out artifacts, distinguishing backgrounds, and so on’ (ibid., p . 273).
7According to Mayo’s statistical error account, or approach of “severe testing”,
a severe test is a test with a low error probability, i.e. a low probability of passing a
test in spite of being false. Mayo’s programme is primarily directed against
Bayesianism, which she calls a “theory-dominated philosophy of confirmation”
(Mayo 1994, p. 272). Bayesians try to establish quantitative measures for the
appraisal of theories. Given a particular initial probabilistic value of credence
assigned to a hypothesis H, Bayesians ask how much some evidence e increases or
decreases this value. This is measured by the conditional probability of H, given e,
using Bayes’ theorem. Although for Mayo, too, probabilities are the main tool in her
account “probability is associated with the test procedure, not with the hypothesis”
and thus “error probabilities are not degrees of credibility”, as for the Bayesians
(Carrier 2001, p. 94; cf. Mayo 1996, p. 11, p. 72). Rather,
Error probabilities are not probabilities of hypotheses [like in Bayesianism],
but the probabilities that certain experimental results would occur, were one
or another hypothesis true about the experimental system (Mayo 1996, p.
367).
That is, probabilities in Mayo’s account do not measure the degree of credence of a
hypothesis (as in Bayesianism) but rather represent the probabilities of “how
mistaken” one could be when holding a particular hypothesis given the state of the
world. It is the significance level (set arbitrarily and usually to the value of 5%), i.e.
the probability that H has been accepted erroneously, which decides whether we
should adopt a hypothesis or not. Another important difference between Mayo’s
account and Bayesianism is her rejection of “white gloves” epistemology (see Carrier
2002, p. 94). Mayo refrains from simply assuming that the data are “already at hand”,
as she accuses Bayesians of doing. Rather, she is interested in the process of how
trustworthy data are obtained which includes the task of ruling out artefacts, noise etc.
Mayo claims that her account manages to accomplish these tasks. In the following I
want to discuss whether this claim can really be justified by drawing on the discovery
of WNC, as Mayo (1994, 1996) has done.
83 WEAK NEUTRAL CURRENTS AND STATISTICAL INFERENCES
TOWARDS THEM
There are three fundamental forces in particle physics: weak, electromagnetic, and
strong forces. In the early 1970s the so-called Salam-Weinberg-Glashow model
unified the electromagnetic forces and weak forces into ‘electroweak’ forces. A
postulate of this model, however, was the existence of Weak Neutral Currents
(WNC). WNC are said to have been discovered in 1973/74 by the so-called
Gargamelle group at CERN and were confirmed in about the same year by its U.S.
counterpart consisting of researchers from Harvard, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin at
the National Accelerator Laboratory (dubbed Fermilab in 1974) (henceforth: HPWF)4.
WNC are a form of weak interaction between subatomic particles. In contrast
to their charged current counterparts, WNC are not mediated by charged bosons
(either W+ or W-), but rather by electrically neutral Z0 bosons. In neutrino-nucleon
scattering, charged currents produce muons5, whereas neutral currents do not (see Fig.
2). Because WNC cannot directly be detected experimentally, the non-production of
muons became the main identifier of WNC events.
Fig. 2: Neutrino-nucleon scattering.
a) charged current event, mediated
by a W+ boson, which carries a
positive charge from the reaction v
→ μ-  to the reaction n → p (where 
v = neutrino, n = nucleon, p =
proton, μ- = muon); b) neutral
current event, mediated by an
electrically neutral Z0 boson (also
characterised as massive analogue
of the photon in electron
scattering). Neutral current events
produced in scattering are
characterised by the charge
remaining the same for incoming
and outcoming particles (upper and
lower parts of the diagrams
respectively). From
Pickering (1984).
4 The caveat about the discovery claim I shall justify below.
5 Like electrons, muons are electrically charged, and subject to both electromagnetic and weak
but not strong forces (i.e. the defining characteristic of leptons, as opposed to hadrons).
9Quoting Galison, Mayo (1994) asks “how did the experimentalists themselves come
to believe that neutral currents existed? What persuaded them that they were looking
at a real effect and not at an artefact of the machine or the environment?”6. Mayo’s
answer, as we shall see in this section, boils down to statistical arguments. Given that
WNC are characterised by an absence of muonless events, counting muonless events
should be sufficient in principle establishing whether WNC were present in the
experiement or not. There is however a very problematic complication. The number
of muonless events represents not only neutral current candidates, but crucially also
those muonless events which are due to charged currents with wide angle muons that
are not detected in the chamber (see Fig. 3).
Fig. 3: Wide angle muons in the HWPF
experiments.
Figure shows a schematic diagram of
the HWPF detector (including a
calorimeter and a µ-spectrometer) and
wide-angle escaping muons. From
Galison (1983).
Mayo calls this the artefact explanation. Mayo goes on to set up the question of
whether the effects obtained by the HPWF group in 1972 had to be considered an
artefact or a “true” effect, as an instance of classical hypothesis testing. Allegedly,
reconstructing the reasoning of the HPWF group, Mayo presents us with two
alternative hypotheses of the observed “muonless” neutrino induced scattering events:
H: neutral currents are responsible for (at least some of) the results;
H is false (the artefact explanation): recorded muonless events are due, not to
neutral currents, but to wide-angle muons escaping detection.
Non-H is an artefact explanation because it says that although it might appear that H
is true (i.e. that muonless events are due to neutral currents), the results are in fact due
to another cause, namely wide-angle muons escaping detection, generating the
appearance of neutral currents, when in fact only negative currents are present. Given
6 Cf. Galison 1987, p. 136.
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the experimental findings about muonless and muonful events in the spark chamber,
the significant question, according to Mayo, is:
What is the probability of a ratio (of muonless to muonful events) as great as
54/56, given that H is false? (Mayo 1994, p. 275)
That is, what is the probability that non-H, i.e. the artefact explanation claiming the
absence of neutral currents and the exclusive presence of charged currents, is true?
First of all, it should be noted that the way Mayo sets up the “severe test” for neutral
current does not allow for genuine alternatives: either the results are explained by the
existence of neutral currents (H) or they are not explained by H and the results are due
to an artefact. There is no alternative between neutral currents existing and neutral
currents not existing. So contrary to her own demands, Mayo’s test scenario for
neutral currents is not at all severe for the claim that neutral currents exist. But I want
to leave that aside and follow Mayo further in her argument instead. As I said above,
probability for Mayo is not a measure for the credibility of hypotheses (as for the
Bayesians) but rather it is a measure of the significance level of the results. The
significance level, in turn, is the probability that the null hypothesis (in our case H)
will be rejected even though it is the correct explanation (also called a “false
positive”). A high level of significance then, of course, means a low reliability of the
test. The level must be as low as possible for a test to be severe7 . Thus, if the
significance level is very low (say .01 or .001) it would be “extremely improbable for
so many muonless events [i.e. 54] to result, if H were false [i.e. if the artefact
explanation were true] […] since escaping muons could practically never be
responsible for so many muonless events, their occurrence in the experiment is taken
as good ground for rejecting the artefact explanation” (Mayo 1994, p. 275). In the
words of Galison,
By comparing the number of muons expected not to reach the muon
spectrometer with the number of measured muonless events, [the researchers]
could determine if there was a statistically significant excess of neutral
candidates. (Galison 1987, p. 217)
Crucially, muonless events due to wide angle muons (i.e. those not reaching the muon
detector) cannot be measured but must be estimated. This was done with the so-called
7 However, the smaller the significance level, the higher the likelihood of accepting a false
null hypothesis. This is called a type II error (also false negative) and has to be weighed up
against a type I error.
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Monte-Carlo simulations. Monte Carlo simulations are probabilistic. According to
Mayo,
Probabilistic considerations are deliberately introduced into the data analysis
because they offer a way to model the expected effect of the artifact (escaping
muons). Statistical considerations, we might call them "manipulations on
paper" (or on computer) [here: Monte Carlo simulations], afford a way to
subtract out background factors that cannot literally be controlled for.
(p. 276; altered emphasis)
Mayo then follows Galison who she quotes as saying about the HPWF group: “they
wanted to know how likely it was that the observed ratio of muonless to muon-ful
events (54/56) would fall within the statistical spread of the calculated ratio (24/56),
due entirely to wide-angle muons” (Galison 1987, p. 220). The difference between the
observed and the calculated ratio of neutral current candidate events (NC) to charged
current events (CC) ratio (NC/CC) to be expected is therefore 54/56 – 24/56 = .536.
According to Mayo, the “significant question” is whether this difference was
improbable on the assumption that non-H, i.e. that the artefact explanation, was true.
Since this difference is higher than five standard deviations8, Mayo concludes “it is
practically impossible for so many muonless events to have been recorded, were they
due to the artefact of wide angle muons” (Mayo 1994, p. 277). In other words, the
existence of neutral currents, and its discrimination from “noise” or artefacts, was
warranted by the statistical methods the HPWF researchers used. Mayo concedes that
her account is “[a]bstracted from the whole story” and its theoretical and sociological
context, but nevertheless Mayo claims that her focus on – what she thinks – the “bare
bones of the experimental analysis” is sufficient for establishing whether the observed
experimental effects were neutral currents or mere artefacts (cf. Mayo 1994, p. 274). I
strongly disagree. In fact, Mayo’s very restricted focus quite severely distorts how
neutral currents were actually discerned from background noise. Widening our focus
in the analysis of the historical case will make clear that statistical analysis was
insufficient for establishing neutral currents as the cause of the data.
8 The standard deviation is estimated by inserting the measured values above into a “standard
statistical model” (see Mayo 1994, note 7).
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3.1 It’s Not All about Statistics
First of all, it is worth mentioning that Mayo is only considering one particular kind of
experiment that was performed in the hunt for WNC. The experiments on neutral
currents were of two kinds: bubble and spark chambers. A bubble chamber consists of
a tank of superheated liquid (usually Freon) held under pressure to prevent boiling.
When particles are “shot” into the tank, bubbles form along the tracks of electrically
charged particles. Non-charged particles like neutrons, neutrinos, and Z0 bosons
which mediate WNC (see Fig. 2) cannot be observed. One needs to infer those neutral
particles from the products that remain after scattering—those products must not
change charge (in comparison to the incoming particles). A typical picture of a neutral
current event taken in a bubble chamber is depicted in Fig. 4a.
Fig. 4: Neutral current event.
a): Bubble chamber picture of a neutral
current event, and (b): schematic
representation of a). Neutrinos leave no
track. Only the hadron events do. From
Pickering (1983).
In contrast to bubble chambers, in spark chambers the passage of electrically charged
particles is recorded by electronic means rather than by physical ones (bubbles). Both
methods have their merits and shortcomings. There is a trade-off between quantity
and quality. Whereas bubble chambers provide more detail of the individual tracks,
spark chambers record a much higher rate of interactions but less detail. Mayo, in her
analysis, discusses only the latter experiments, which of course are a priori more
susceptible to statistical analysis. There is even one type of event which is utterly
unsusceptible to statistical analysis: neutral lepton current events. These events are
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very rare. The first event of this sort, depicted in Fig. 5, was found in a total of
700,000 pictures9.
Fig. 5: The first ever recorded neutral lepton
current event.
Neutral lepton current ( v + e- → v + e-)
recorded in Gargamelle/CERN, found in
Aachen/Germany. The picture shows an electron’s
trajectory going from the left to the right of the
picture. The white circles are just lights
illuminating the bubble-chamber liquid and thus
have neither evidential nor theoretical import.
From Hasert et al. (1973).
How was this first lepton current event found? Bogen and Woodward (1988), who, it
should be said, view bubble chamber photographs as data and WNC as phenomena,
assert that generally
the extent to which such methods of data-reduction are independent of any
concern with explanation is illustrated by the fact that the person or machine
performing these tasks can carry them out without understanding either the
theory which explains the interactions for which the photographs are
evidence, or the physical principles by which the equipment works. Data-
reduction aimed at isolating and analyzing relevant data does not require
explanation of the data, even though it may be essential to establishing
reliability. (ibid., p. 333; my emphasis)
That is, according to Bogen and Woodward (1988) for data analysis and reduction,
one need not have any understanding whatsoever of the theory that seeks to explain
the phenomena, which the data are supposed to support. It is interesting to note,
however, that the so-called Aachen picture of Fig. 5 was first misidentified by ‘the
women scanning the bubble-chamber negatives’ as a charged current event and it took
the research student Franz Hasert (i.e. someone with a good knowledge of the theory
9 Miller and Bullock (1994) refer to Pickering’s number of 700,000 events as being “trivially
incorrect because the single picture was found after scanning 100,000 pictures” (p. 925).
Miller and Bullock (1994) do not provide any sources, but appear to rely on Perkins (1997) as
they do in the rest of their article quite heavily. And yet, it is not Pickering but them who did
not do their homework properly. The original article by Hasert et al. (1973) proves Pickering
correct: “A total of 375 000 v and 360 000 v pictures were scanned twice and one single
electron event satisfying the selection criteria was found in the v film“ (p. 122).
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at stake) to identify this picture correctly (cf. Galison 1983). More importantly, this
single picture was enough to persuade some of the reality of neutral currents. Miller
and Bullock quote Perkins (1997) as saying that “after this memorable episode,
everything that subsequently happened in the neutral current story was for me
something of an anticlimax” (p. 5). Also Galison (1983, p. 486) quotes Helmut
Faissner (a later member of the Gargamelle group at CERN) as saying that “the event
has excited us a great deal” (p. 487)10. Statements like these stand in stark contrast
with Bogen and Woodward’s assessment of the epistemic import of the Aachen
picture:
[…] matters must be arranged so that data is [sic] produced sufficiently
frequently and in sufficiently large amounts […] to support conclusions about
the existence of phenomena […] In the neutral current experiments, for
example, some investigators initially favored the use of interactions involving
the scattering of an electron off a neutrino [i.e. potential lepton neutral current
events] […] It had the very serious disadvantage that it occurs very rarely,
and thus is unlikely to yield enough data to support statistically reliable
conclusions. For this reason, the investigators focused on interactions
involving neutrinos and nucleons [i.e. potential hadron neutral currents],
which produce much more data […] (Bogen and Woodward 1988, p. 320; my
emphasis)
Quite obviously Bogen and Woodward seem to have misjudged the situation here. If
they were right that statistics plays the role in experiments that they think it does, the
Aachen picture would have not had much value for the scientists involved in the
WNC experiments. After all, they had obtained just a single picture! And still, it was
enough for some of the researchers to convince themselves of the reality of WNC to
such an extent that everything afterwards was “something of an anticlimax” 11. But
back to Mayo.
10 Pickering (1984) has claimed that “it is a common place of particle physics that a single
event cannot prove the existence of a new phenomenon” (p. 93, fn. 16), and has been harshly
criticised for that (Miller and Bullock 1994; Rousset 1994). If it really was the case that this
single event had such persuasive power, it harms Pickering’s opponents more than himself, as
we shall see below.
11 Gallison (1983 and 1987) makes out two different research traditions within high energy
physics: a visual and a statistical tradition. Whereas some experimenters, in the “image”
tradition, seek to discover “golden events”, i.e. “single picture[s] of such clarity and
distinctness that it commands acceptance” (ibid., p. 22), experimenters of the logic tradition
are interested in data amenable to statistics. Clearly, the Aachen picture was most satisfactory
to the visual tradition. For a criticism of Galison’s distinction, see Staley (1999). Staley does
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4 WEAK NEUTRAL CURRENT EXPERIMENTS IN THE 1960S
Mayo focuses not only on the HPWF experiments (rather than the Gargamelle bubble
chamber experiments) but she also focuses on experiments which were performed in
the early 1970s and disregards those experiments that were performed already in the
1960s12. Rather curiously, the experimental techniques and designs of the 1960s—
apart from refinements as to their size, for instance—were essentially the same that
were used in the 1970s. Pickering (1989) therefore asks quite justifiably:
How can experiments at one time demonstrate the non-existence of some
empirical phenomenon, and then later its existence? (ibid., pp. 224-5)
Galison’s account does not answer this question but rather glosses over it. As
Pickering notes, Galison’s account “handles this problem with the language of
‘mistakes’, ‘misfortunes’ and so on” (Pickering 1989, p. 225), whereby
Galison nowhere documents and analyzes the nature of the earlier mistakes;
he asserts that whatever was done in the 1960s was mistaken. (ibid.; original
emphasis)
According to Pickering, Galison’s account “edits out” the 1960s experiments at the
expense of his account being “prone to self-destruct”, because one may justly want to
ask why the 1960s experiments were mistaken. What was wrong with them if the
1970s experiments “took place in the domain of established physics, meaning within
established techniques and theoretical ideas” (Galison 1983, p. 505; emphasis added),
which were already part of practice in the 1960s.13 Mayo does not even mention this
problem. And yet, as we shall see in the next section, the consideration of the 1960s
not question the existence of the two sorts of practices but he does claim that they were not as
clear cut as Galison suggests they are.
12 According to Pickering five spark chamber experiments were performed in the 1960s. Two
in Brookhaven, two at CERN and one at the Argonne National Laboratoy near Chicago. See
Pickering (1984, p. 101; fn 101).
13 It is striking that two other detailed accounts of the discovery of neutral currents either
gloss over or completely ignore the 1960s experiments (see Sciulli 1979, Miller and Bullock
1994). Miller and Bullock (1994) are harshly critical of Pickering (1984), who provides the
only account that addresses this shift aptly. Miller and Bullock say for instance that
“Consequently, to assert, as Pickering does […], that neutral currents were in the data is
meaningless because they were all but swamped by background” (p. 924). This represents a
gross misunderstanding of Pickering by Miller and Bullock because Pickering does in fact
assert that neutral currents were subsumed (!) under the neutron background. See main text
below for details.
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experiments is absolutely fundamental for a proper understanding of how the effect of
neutral currents was discerned from its background.
4.1 The 1960s Spark Chamber Experiments by the HPWF
Group
Statistics would have not been of much use in discovering WNC in the 1960s spark
chamber experiments14. Working in the paradigm of the then accepted V–A theory of
electroweak interactions (see Section 7 for details), which presumed that only charged
currents existed, the HPWF group built their electronic detectors in such a way that
they would register only those neutrino-induced events in which muons were
produced. This was done in order to filter out all the uninteresting neutron
background. But of course, it effectively meant that neutral currents could not
possibly have been observed with this trigger. Statistics would have been utterly
useless for discerning WNC because the apparatus was built in such a way as to
simply eliminate any sort of neutral current ‘signal’. Before neutral currents could
therefore be recorded, the muon trigger had to be modified accordingly. As Rubbia
recalled, this modification was carried out “not because I had decided it [beforehand],
but because Steve Weinberg gave me good reason for it” (Rubbia 1980, interviewed
by Galison (1983))15. Quickly the HPWF group realised that the signal they were
immediately recording might be induced by wide-angle muons and devised a Monte
Carlo program for estimating the number of wide-angle muons (already discussed in
Section 3). On the basis of these estimates (R=NC/CC=0.20±0.09)16 , the HPWF
group submitted a draft announcing the discovery in the Physical Review Letters.
However, the HPWF group did not stop there. In order to keep the wide-angle muons
to a minimum, they decreased the distance between the calorimeter and the muon
spectrometer (Fig. 6), making the capturing of wide-angle muons by the spectrometer
more likely. This, however, posed a new problem. The decrease of the separation
between the front and the rear of the chamber from 4 feet of iron to mere 13 inches of
steel could cause another unwanted effect: hadrons might “punch through” the
14 See footnote 12.
15 The “good reason” had to do with the fact that WNC were a consequence of Weinberg-
Salam model, which I shall have more to say about below.
16 Compare this with R=54/56=0.96, which Mayo quotes above in Section 3.4.1.1.
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reduced separation into the muon spectrometer (see Fig. 6) where they would
automatically be identified as muons, increasing the number of muonful events and
thus cancelling a potential neutral current signal.
Fig. 6: Hadron punch-through.
Picture shows a schematic diagram of the
HWPF detector and hadron punch-
through. From Galison (1983). Cf. Fig. 3.
However, after estimating the penetration rate of hadrons at about 13% of all the
hadron events in the chamber, the HPWF group concluded that this would be
insufficient to account for the muon-ful events detected in the rear of the detector. The
HPWF group noted that the “neutral-current signal was very much smaller than
[previously assumed] […] possibly being zero” and thus “no significant evidence for
the existence of the weak neutral current” could be provided (Pickering
1983, p. 103; cf. Galison 1983, p. 501). At this point, it seemed, the HWPF group had
established the non-existence of neutral currents. A draft paper was prepared to
replace the earlier version (discussed above), where they reversed their own
conclusion from a discovery claim to a “non-discovery” claim17.
So how did the HPWF group then get from a claim about the absence of
neutral currents to a discovery claim? This crucial step, quite astoundingly, remains
unexplained in Galison’s account. He almost handwavingly states that as a “result
both of pressure from outside the collaboration and of new evidence from within the
group, opinions were changing”. The hadron punch through estimate doubled, and the
muon-ful/muon-less ratio was re-calculated at 12-15%18. Notice that this value lies
17 The fact that the HPWF group discovered, then withdrew their discovery claim and then
withdrew from their withdrawal resulted in the joke that the group had discovered “alternating
neutral currents”.
18 Cf. Galison (1983, p. 502). Galison does not give reasons for this change of the HPWF
group’s attitude towards neutral currents other than three “pieces of evidence”, whereby the
“most convincing for Cline” (a member of the HPWF group) Galison takes to be the finding
that “among twenty neutral current candidates, five ‘had no hint of wide-angle tracks’”
constituting an argument with “a small selection of events, clean of possible edge effects, and
with an analysis that did not require resorting to Monte Carlo techniques” (pp. 502-3; my
emphasis; for details on the Monte Carlo calculations see Section 5.1). This, of course,
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well below the one Mayo quotes (cf. Section 3 of this paper). Sometime before
August 1973 a decision was finally taken to proceed with the publication of the
original paper (confirming the existence of WNC), supplemented with the refining
work of the experimental design that had taken place in the meantime.
4.2 Pre-Gargamelle Bubble Chamber Experiments at CERN
In support of his claim that the experimental machinery already used in the 1960s was
apt for making a discovery claim about WNC, Pickering—among many other
things—refers to the following quote by Frank Sciulli, a member of the Gargamelle
group at CERN in the 1960s, who later recalled that
In retrospect, it is likely that events due to neutral currents had been seen as
early as 1967. Data from the CERN heavy-liquid bubble chamber […]
showed a surprisingly large number of events with hadrons in the final state,
but with no visible muon [i.e. neutral current candidates]. In 1967 there was
little pressure to rectify these uncertainties. Five years later the theoretical
climate had changed dramatically, so there were persistent but cautious
efforts to conclusively resolve whether such events were actually anomalous.
(Sciulli 1979, p. 45)
I shall return to Sciulli’s statement that the “theoretical climate” had changed in
Section 7. But let us concentrate on Sciulli’s claim that already the 1960s experiments
had detected neutral current candidates. Miller and Bullock (1994) have questioned
the trustworthiness of Sciulli’s recollection, claiming that the “CERN bubble chamber
was 1.2m long [in contrast to Gargamelle’s size of 4.8m], too short to disentangle
neutral currents from charged ones” (ibid., p. 906; cf. p. 911). We shall see in a
moment that this claim by Miller and Bullock is incorrect. But it is worth mentioning
first of all that Sciulli is not alone with his recollection. Faissner, for instance, very
much like Sciulli, recalls that
Having seen these photos myself, and too lightly dismissed them as neutron
stars, I cannot blame this slip on unfit instrumentation: Our old
sparkchambers were well suited for the interaction analysis. That we did not
believe what we saw was an unfortunate conspiration of mental blocking, by
although it might explain why a particular individual (here: Cline) was convinced of the
existence of WNC, by no means establishes why WNC became to be accepted in the physics
community.
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theoretical prejudice, and experimental mischief. (Faissner 1979, partially
quoted in Galison 1983, p. 483) 19
Also Dieter Haidt, another member of the Gargamelle group, recalls about the CERN
bubble chamber experiments prior to Gargamelle that “such events [neutral currents]
were just waiting among the already scanned events” (Haidt 2004, p. 27; my
emphasis). Surely, all these recollections cannot be blamed on bad memory! A.
Rousset, a researcher of NPA (Nuclear Physics Apparatus, the precursor of
Gargamelle), retrospectively even stated that he could prove that a neutral current
signal was already present in the 1960s:
It was particularly perverse [sic] to demonstrate in retrospect that neutral
currents were already standing in the picture taken in 1967 in the CERN/NPA
chamber. The proof was given in 1974 [Rousset quotes his contribution to the
High Energy Physics Conference in London (1974)] using the print out of
those neutrino events from the 1967 experiment at CERN. (Rousset
1994, p. 347)
Before I shall go into some details about some of the data indicating the existence of
WNC which were already available in the 1960s, one needs to notice that—as in spark
chambers—WNC have to be discerned from artefacts. As in the spark chambers, the
relevant artefacts in bubble chambers are caused by charged events whose muons are
not detected. More specifically, in bubble chambers artefact WNC-type events are
caused by charged current events occurring in the shielding of the chamber, where
they produce muons and neutrons. Whereas the muons (because negatively charged)
propagate to the periphery of the chamber within the shielding, the neutrons shoot into
the chamber where they cause hadron events. Because neutrons—like WNC—do not
leave any tracks in the chamber (remember, only charged currents do), and because
their associated muons do not make it to the visible chamber (where they would leave
tracks) they will be identified as WNC proper (Fig. 7). Therefore, one needs to take
extra care to rule out neutron stars as potential explanans for the observed WNC-type
events.
19 Although Faissner explicitly mentions sparkchambers in this quote, he refers to the
following PhD theses: E.C. Young, Oxford Thesis (1966) and Yellow Report CERN 67-12;
M. Paty, Paris Thesis (1965), and CERN 65-12; M. Holder, Aachen Thesis (1967) and
Aachen Report PITHA-19. The first two theses discussed bubble chamber experiments.
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4.2.1 Disregarded Evidence for Neutral Current Events in the 1960s
As Pickering notes, Young—a graduate student compiling his PhD thesis—who made
“the most detailed analysis of the neutrino runs from 1963 to 1965” including the use
of Monte Carlo calculations for cascades taking place in the shielding (see Section
5.1), found that 150 neutral-current type events could not be attributed to neutron
background, compared with around 570 charged current events, making for a ratio of
1:4, the ratio later to be found in Gargamelle (Pickering 1983, p. 99)20. Sakurai (1978)
concurs that
20 Pickering, in a footnote (1983, p. 205, fn. 12), concedes that Young did not explicitly state
those 150 neutral current type events, but claims that “it follows directly from the background
estimate (Young 1967, p. 58) and the counts of different types of events (ibid., p. 39, Table
Fig. 7: Neutron stars in bubble chamber.
The figure shows two forms of neutron stars triggered by a neutrino beam.
Above: a neutrino hits a nucleus, producing a muon (-), hadrons, and a neutron
(n). The neutron, again, hits another nucleus, producing even more hadrons, but
without producing a muon. The event caused by the neutron can
unproblematically be associated with the neutrino beam (and hence be identified
as a charged current event), which is why these events are called “associated
events” (AS) (also called neutron stars (n*)). All this happens within the visible
chamber. Below: starting in the invisible shielding, making the muon event (μ-)
undetectable. The latter gives the appearance of a neutral current event (non-
associated or “background event” (B)). The interaction length of the AS events
within the chamber serves as the basis for estimating the number of
unobservable B events by means of Monte Carlo programmes. Diagram from
Haidt (2004); adapted. Also compare with the problem of „escaping muons“ in
the HPWF experiment (Fig. 3).
Neutron star
21
In [Young’s] thesis he is reputed to have concluded that the number of
muonless events was about three times the neutron background he could
estimate […] if these excess muonless events had been attributed to neutral
currents, we would have obtained a neutral-to-charged current ratio of 17±
6%, roughly the currently accepted value. (Sakurai 1978, p. 44)
According to Pickering the later estimates by the Gargamelle group were therefore
„essentially only refinements of those made earlier by E.C.M Young […]“ (Pickering
1983, p. 192; see also Pickering 1984, p. 99). However, for Young and his supervisors
this was not enough for inferring support for neutral currents. On the contrary, even
though Young recognized neutral currents as a possible explanans, neutral current
type candidates were subsumed under “neutron background”:
Neutral events without lepton candidates [i.e. possible neutral-current events]
are taken as neutron-induced background. This is true only when neutrino
interactions of the neutral current type are neglected. (Young 1966, p. 41)
So for some reason, Young decided that WNC should indeed be neglected as a
possible explanation of the data and instead preferred to explain his data by “leakage
effects from the primary proton beam” (Young 1967, p. 58), i.e. effectively by
neutron background (see below for details). In striking parallel, G. Myatt in “the most
extensive” discussion of neutron background in a CERN experiment carried out in
1967 noted that “a considerable number of neutral events were found which had no μ-
[muon] candidate” (i.e. WNC type events) and went on to say that “[i]t is interesting
to speculate on the origin of these neutrons [!]”, without even considering whether
neutral currents might be responsible for the observed muonless events (quoted in
Pickering 1984, p. 98). Myatt and his group compared the muonless events (Fig. 8,
left) with the associated neutron stars they had observed (Fig. 8, right).
2.3)”. Pickering portays Young as dissenting from the general 1960s paradigm, in which the
existence of WNC remained unconsidered. This is not the case. See main text.
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Fig. 8: Early, neglected, recordings of Neutral Current candidates.
Left: Neutral current type events. Right: Observed neutron stars in the NPA chamber (the
pre-Gargamelle chamber at CERN). From Myatt (1974).
Myatt concluded that the “isolated neutron stars” in Fig. 8 (left) (i.e., in fact, the
observed neutral current candidates) were “more numerous” than the observed
neutron stars in the chamber (Fig. 8, right). Comparing the neutral current candidates
of Fig. 8 (left) with the neutron stars of Fig. 8 (right) (for Evis > 50 MeV), they found a
ratio of about 20:1 (!) in favour of WNC candidates. But instead of making a
discovery claim or at least exploring the possibility of neutral currents, they simply
blamed all neutral current type events on neutron stars by fiat. Without even
attempting a quantitative analysis, as was later going to be carried out (see Section
5.1), they blamed the production of neutron stars in the shielding for all WNC-type
events.
Given not only the anecdotal but also the quantitative evidence discussed in
this section, there can hardly be any doubt that had the experimentalists been willing
to discover weak neutral currents already in the 1960s, they would have done so!
4.3 Upper Limits, Inclusive vs. Exclusive Currents, and Energy
Cuts
Rather than citing the neutral current signal they observed as such, experimentalists
preferred to set upper limits for neutral currents, which did not discriminate between
neutron background and neutral currents. Continuing the quote above, Rousset says
that
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In conclusion, the neutral currents were already present in the pictures taken
in 1967 at CERN. Why have they not been found then? These events were
only used to set an upper limit [quotes Cundy (1970)]. (Rousset 1994, p. 347)
In Block et al. (1964) a limit of 3% was set on the ratio of elastic neutral current (NC)













This limit existed in the literature as long as until 1970, when Cundy et al. (1970)
pushed the upper limit upwards to 12 ± 6%.22 However, Weinberg (1972) showed that
this “limit” was within the predictions of his model of electroweak forces (15-25%)
arguing that “the proposed theory is neither confirmed nor refuted” by the data, and
that “a more detailed analysis of the data is needed (ibid., p. 1415). Palmer (1973),
too, concluded that “although no experimental claims to the observation of neutral
currents have yet been made, nevertheless the published data is consistent with the
simple Weinberg model […]”23. Recently, Weinberg said about these limits that
A 1970 experiment [by Cundy et al.] had given a value of 0.12 plus or minus
0.06 for this ratio, but the experimenters didn’t believe that they were actually
seeing neutral currents, so they didn’t claim to have observed a neutral
current reaction at a level of roughly 12% of the charged current reaction, and
instead quoted this result as an upper bound. The minimum theoretical value
0.15 of this ratio applies for sine-squared theta equal to 0.25, which is not far
from what we now know, is the correct value. I suspect that this 1970
experiment had actually observed neutral currents, but you get credit for
making discoveries only when you claim that you have made the discovery.
(Weinberg 2004, p. 10; my emphasis)
Even though the data for a discovery claim were available, the will was not.
Apart from the fact that experimentalists in the 1960s spoke of limits rather
than signals, there were two more procedures used by the experimentalists that added
to the diminishment of neutral currents. First, as Pickering (1984, p. 99, fn. 33) notes,
21 Cross-sections refer to the effective area of interaction between beam and target particles.
Elastic cross sections refer to those events where no new particles are produced (e.g. AB → 
AB), whereas inelastic events refer to particle producing events (e.g. AB → ABC). Cf. 
Pickering (1984, p. 28).
22 According to Perkins (1997) this was due to a “stupid book-keeping error”. The original
article by Cundy et al. reads that “the previous limit [NC/CC] << 0.03 given by us is wrong,
since single unidentified positive tracks were incorrectly assumed to be pions” (Cundy et al.
1970).
23 Publication of this paper—for some reason—was delayed until after the Gargamelle report
was published. See Pickering (1984, p. 205. fn. 15)
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attention focused on exclusive (e.g. v + p → v + π+ + n), rather than inclusive events (v
+ N → v + X, where N = target nucleon (neutron or proton) and X = any hadron), with
the latter having a much larger cross section and therefore a much bigger chance to be
detected24. Second, all bubble chamber experiments (the ones in the 1960s as much as
the ones in the 1970s) imposed an energy cut of 1 GeV on the data in order to reduce
the neutron background. However, this cut in the 1960s was performed on the basis of
the “visible” energy, i.e. the energy of the events on the film. In consequence, whereas
the energy of the charged current events comprised hadron energies plus the energy of
their associated muon (cf. Fig. 7 below), the energy of the neutral current events
consisted of hadron energies only. This automatically resulted in more charged
current than WNC-type events. In the context of the presuppositions of the 1960s this
made sense because it was presumed that all neutral candidates were due to neutron
background. This procedure was changed in the 1970s in the Gargamelle experiments,
when experimentalists—induced by theorists—started to consider the existence of
neutral currents. Under this new presupposition, the cutting procedure had become
“unfair”. The Gargamelle experimenters abandoned the old cutting procedure and
calculated only the total energy of the hadron events, leaving out the energies of the
muon events to establish equality in calculating the energies and consequently the
ratio of WNC-type to charged current events. Considering this point in his book even
Galison (1987) writes:
Data analysis could make that radical difference. How events were analyzed
and what resources were devoted to the task of sorting and structuring the
flood of information available from the large experiment could often give an
experiment an enormous advantage, or even determine if and when a
discovery was made. (p. 174; original plus added emphasis)
So, quite obviously, there was a change in the experimentalists’ attitudes towards their
evidence that cannot be explained by the data themselves. Reasons for this change
will be considered in Section 7. In the face of the positive evidence for WNC that
quite obviously were available already in the 1960s experiments, one may wonder
how Miller and Bullock came to the conclusion that the 1960s Gargamelle bubble
chamber experiments were inappropriate for discovering neutral currents (see Section
4.2 on page 18).
24 Notice that the upper limit given by Block et al. (1964) and Cundy et al. (1970), quoted
above, is for an exclusive current.
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5 THE ARGUMENT FROM SPATIAL DISTRIBUTIONS
Why do Miller and Bullock claim that the pre-Gargamelle chamber at CERN was too
small for the neutral current effects to be observed? Miller and Bullock’s claim stems
from the following argument made by the CERN physicists in their discovery paper
(Hasert et al. 1973). Hasert et al.’s argument tried to take advantage of the spatial
distribution of neutron background events and neutral current events respectively
within the chamber. Diagrams a), b), d), e) of Fig. 9 display the spatial distributions of
neutral current type events (NC) and charged current events (CC) for both neutrino (v)
and antineutrino induced events ( v ). Diagrams c) and f) display the ratio NC/CC,
showing that the distribution of both NC and CC is almost isomorph.
Fig. 9: The argument from spatial distributions.
See main text for details. From Hasert et al. (1973).
Both the distribution of NC and CC is uniform along the length of the chamber. And
this is the crucial point now. Hasert et al. argued that if the neutral current type events
were caused by neutrons induced by the neutrino beam at the front of the chamber,
one would expect an exponential decrease of neutron reaction along the chamber
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length. This is depicted in diagram g) of Fig. 9, where the observed neutron stars
within the chamber are plotted. If one now subtracts the latter diagram from diagrams
a) and d) one should – according to this argument – obtain all the genuine neutral
current events. This is the argument from the spatial distribution of the events, and it
is this argument which a large part of the CERN group wanted to publish as evidence
for neutral currents. Notice that this argument crucially depends on the so-called
interaction length of neutrons: if the interaction length of neutrons is not much shorter
than the length of the chamber, the argument from spatial distribution simply cannot
be made. And this is what Miller and Bullock imply for the CERN chambers, which
were used before Gargamelle. They quote Galison as saying “the very possibility of
using the spatial distribution of neutral candidates as a test of the neutron background
hinged on the fact that Gargamelle was much larger than any previous bubble
chamber” (Galison 1987, p. 169). According to Miller and Bullock in the Gargamelle
chamber therefore “there was effectively a built-in calibration of the neutron
background” (Miller and Bullock 1994, p. 912; original emphasis). However, this
claim is simply incorrect. The interaction length of neutrons, i.e. the length before
they hit a nucleus, is only 70cm, much less than the 1.2 metre of the 1960s CERN
bubble chamber25. An argument from spatial distribution was possible in principle in
the old chambers already. However, even if Miller and Bullock’s claim was right, the
argument from spatial distribution was simply insufficient for proving the existence of
neutral currents, as was pointed out by Haidt and Fry (1973, 1975), both members of
the Gargamelle group. Haidt and Fry drew attention to two points “which damped the
euphoria” that had sprung from the spatial distribution argument (Haidt 2004, p. 28).
The first point, although simple, was quite devastating. In the argument from
distribution, it was assumed that neutrons would enter from the front of the chamber
along the (anti-)neutrino beam only. This, however, was a gross oversimplification.
25 Miller and Bullock (1994) do not even bother mentioning the interaction length. The
interaction length of 70cm can however be found in Haidt (2004), and in Fry and
Haidt (1975). Although Galison (1983) states that “neutrons had an interaction length in the
bubble-chamber liquid longer than the dimensions of the older bubble chambers” (p. 484), in
Galison (1987) he notes that “in the basement of the CERN EP building even a decade after
the experiment terminated, cartons still sat stuffed full of printouts by Camerini, Osculati,
Pullia, and others from throughout this period; each is marked on the cover “Λ= 
70” (centimetres); “Λ = 50”; and so on” (p. 190).    
27
Genuine neutral current events should be distributed uniformly along the
chamber assuming uniform detection efficiency […] Neutrons entering at the
front produce indeed an exponential fall-off along the neutrino beam axis.
This can be seen in [Fig. 9]. But neutrons entering through the side produce a
flat distribution, just as neutral current events would do. (Fry and Haidt 1975,
p. 12; added emphasis)
In other words, the neutrino beams were not perfectly straight but also had a radial
distribution, knocking off neutrons in the side of the chamber, mimicking neutral
currents. Those neutrons entering through the sides would simply destroy the idea of
the spatial distribution being informative as to the nature of the neutral-current type
events (cf. Fig. 10)26. Therefore, “the spatial distribution can only give a hint to the
nature of the neutral current candidates […]” (Fry and Haidt 1975, p. 12; added
emphasis)27.
Fig. 10: Neutral current type distribution
in Gargamelle.
Spatial distribution of neutral current
type events along the chamber (in
neutrino beam direction). Dashed lines
indicate the calculated front and side
contributions of neutron background. Θ
= angular radius of beam in mrad.
From Fry and Haidt (1975).
The other point, which Haidt (2004) later called the “more dangerous” one, regarded
the fact that AS events could produce neutron cascades in the shielding of the
chamber (Fig. 11):
If there was no cascade effect at all, the background neutrons would originate
essentially from a 1λ thick shielding layer around the chamber. In reality, the
26 Neutrons entering through the sides were induced by the fact that the radial neutrino-flux
distribution “extends well beyond the chamber body and induces in the magnet coils a huge
number of neutrino interactions, which in turn emit neutrons, thus generating a uniform flux
entering sideways the fiducial volume. The net result is a flat X distribution also of n*’s
indistinguishable from neutrino-induced neutral current events“ (Haidt 2004, p. 28).
27 Although this point remained unmentioned in Hasert et al. (1973) it was taken care of in the
lengthier Hasert et al. (1974).
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neutron flux gets multiplied by a factor depending upon the cascade length.
(Fry and Haidt 1975, p. 9)
Fig. 11: Schematic depiction of a neutron cascade.
Neutrino beams (v) entering from the front of the chamber
(left side of the diagram), interacting with neutrons (n) in
the shielding (middle; λ indicates one interaction length), 
and then propagating into the chamber (right).
From Fry and Haidt (1975).
That is, the cascades, consisting of multiple interaction lengths, multiply the
production of neutrons within the shielding, as a function of the cascade length (i.e.
the number of interaction lengths). If there were no cascades, all the neutrons
produced in the shielding would originate from the layer of the shielding towards the
fiducial volume defined by the simple interaction lengths of neutrons. With cascades,
the number of neutrons is multiplied by each cascade step (i.e. by each interaction
length as part of the cascade). The neutrons reaching the chamber after the cascade,
would then appear as neutral current events (see Fig. 7, lower diagram).
There is then a priori no longer a distinctive feature between n-[i.e. neutron-
induced] and v-[i.e. neutrino] induced interactions, unless by a quantitative
calculation the proof is given that the number of n-induced interactions is a
small fraction of the NC candidates despite the cascade effect (Haidt
1994, p. 192; altered emphasis)28.
This then brings us back to the estimation of background neutron-induced events
discussed in the next section: the quantitative calculations, Haidt mentions, are
nothing but Monte Carlo calculations29.
28 Not everybody in the collaboration agreed with Fry and Haidt about the necessity of
performing neutron background calculations that included cascades. On the contrary, Fry told
Galison in 1984 about Lagarrigue’s reaction to his and Haidt’s point about neutron cascading:
‘You know, you’re bogging down the collaboration. We want to prove we’ve got neutral
currents’ (quoted in Galison 1987, p. 193), which clearly indicates that there was a strong
desire to discover neutral currents.
29 There was another argument Haidt put forth. Haidt assumed the worst case, namely that all
NC events were due to neutral background, which gave him a B/AS ratio of 1.0 ± 0.6. It
turned out that the observed ratio B/AS ~ 6 (i.e. background events / associated events), was
in stark contradiction with the calculated ratio B/AS = 1.0 ± 0.6. Haidt took this as a “proof”
of the existence of neutral currents (see Haidt 2004, p. 29). However, it has to be noted that
29
5.1 The Monte Carlo Calculations of Neutron Background
As we saw above, whether one “observes” neutral currents fundamentally depends on
the estimate of the neutron background, i.e. those hadron events, which are induced by
neutrons rather than by neutrinos (see Fig. 7, bottom). This is because, as we also saw
above, neutral currents can be “mimicked” by (in fact, they are observationally
indistinguishable from) neutron induced events. In the case of the HPWF spark
chamber experiments, “fake” muonless events originated when there were wide-angle
muonful events, which were not detected by the apparatus, and by hadron punch-
through. In the Gargamelle bubble chamber experiments, weak neutral current events
were mimicked by those neutron stars, which were produced in the walls of the
chamber (see Fig. 7). Both the neutron background in the HPWF experiment and in
Gargamelle could not be measured. It had to be estimated. Since the number of
observed neutral current candidates is the sum of both genuine and “fake” neutral
currents (i.e. neutron induced events), the lower the estimate of the neutron
background, the higher the number of estimated neutral current events. So in fact, it is
not the case that there were multiple, equally valid arguments which all pointed
towards the existence of neutral currents, as Galison (1984 and 1987) has suggested30.
Rather, everything about the discovery claim about neutral currents hangs on the
Monte Carlo estimates of the neutron background.
Mayo, Galison, Miller and Bullock treat the Monte Carlo calculations as
epistemologically rather unproblematic31. Very much in contrast, Pickering (1983;
1984) has cautioned that the Monte Carlo estimates were far from being
uncontroversial. Pickering lists four grounds (“not exhaustive”) on which the Monte
Carlo simulations could be legitimately challenged: details of the characteristics of the
incoming neutrino beam, probabilities of the production of neutrons by neutrinos,
the calculation of B/AS to be expected was carried out by the Monte Carlo program, which
was highly contested. See next section for details.
30 This mistake has been replicated by e.g. Bogen and Woodward (1988).
31 In his later work, Galison seems to take a more cautious stance towards the epistemological
status of Monte Carlo methods. In his book, Galison claims that “for experimenters, Monte
Carlos [sic] never came to occupy a position of ‘true’ experimentation” (Galison 1987, p.
776). Nevertheless, Galison suggests that “Monte Carlo methods appeared to truly represent
the deeply acausal structure of the world” (p. 778; my emphasis) which seems to indicate that
he takes a realist stance towards Monte Carlo simulations.
30
relevant parameters for the interaction of neutrons and protons with atomic nuclei,
idealised geometry of the apparatus. Pickering claims that “one can easily imagine a
determined critic taking issue with some or all of these assumptions” and mentions
protagonists, who were indeed voicing disagreement and lacking commitment to the
conclusions reached by means of the Monte Carlo simulations (Pickering
1982, p. 96). Moreover, “even if all of the assumptions were granted, it remained the
case that they were the input not to an analytic calculation, but to an extremely
complex numerical simulation” (ibid.).
The details of such simulations are enshrined in machine code and are
therefore inherently unpublishable and not independently verifiable. Thus the
sceptic could legitimately accept the input to the calculation but continue to
doubt its output. (ibid.)
This assessment by Pickering is not as implausible, pessimistic and distortive as
Galison (1983; 1987) and Miller & Bullock (1994) have claimed32. In a review article
in Science Allen Hammond (1973) explained that “[t]hese [Monte Carlo] calculations
are not unusual in particle physics experiments, and while they are not always
accurate, they are in this case considered unlikely to be off by more than 50 percent”.
Nevertheless, due to the smallness of the effect, apparently, “the experimenters
believe that the inaccuracy does not affect their calculations”. Still, Hammond
concedes that the Monte Carlo calculations “represent the least certain link in the
chain of evidence supporting the CERN findings” (p. 374)33. Haidt (2004) recollects
that after the “discovery” paper appeared the Gargamelle group was confronted with
“a painful time of defence against unjustified attacks”34, whereby “the opponents
focused their criticism on the neutron background calculation and in particular on the
32 Reviewing the attacks that have been launched against Pickering (see in particular Allan
Franklin’s work, in which Pickering standardly figures as the archenemy), one may feel that
many of the arguments that have been made against Pickering, are more polemical than
anything else. Pickering’s arguments are often much more subtle than the “self-fulfilling
wish- or desire relativism” that is so often attributed to him by these authors (cf. Pickering
1995). A very nice self-defence by Pickering can be found in his (Pickering 1990).
33 For another critical contemporary remark about Monte Carlo calculations see Physics
Today, November 1973, where it says that “Some experimenters are still worried, however,
because the CERN group had to employ a Monte Carlo calculation to obtain this result”. (p.
19)
34 Haidt even told Galison in 1986 that “my reputation as a scientist was put in
question” (Galison 1987, p. 197, fn. 153).
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treatment of the neutron cascade λC“ (ibid., pp. 29-30). Even within the CERN
collaboration criticism was brought forward against the discovery claims:
The fall of 1973 was quite hot and influential people at CERN made appear
Gargamelle as having made a wrong claim. The critical point was spotted
immediately, namely the treatment of the cascade (Haidt undated)
Given the critical reception of the Monte Carlo model and the cascade calculations in
particular, how was the weak neutral current signal established? How—to say it in the
words of Galison—did the experiments on weak neutral currents end?
6 HOW DO EXPERIMENTS END?
In his book with the same title, Galison (1987) concludes that with the 1974 paper by
the HPWF group, “the first chapter of the discovery of weak neutral currents drew to
an end” (Galison 1983, p. 504). He goes on to say that
Further experiments were performed at many laboratories all over the world
to determine the space-time and isotopic spin structure of the currents, but the
existence of the currents themselves seemed to be assured. (ibid.; my
emphasis)
In other words, with this paper, the experiments trying to determine the existence of
neutral currents ‘ended’, and the discovery could be seen as having been established.
Galison (1983) enforces this impression of the “end” of the experiments by quoting
Cline and Mann – two members of the HPWF group – as saying “I don’t see how to
make these effects go away” and “the signal would not go away” respectively
(pp. 502-3). Yet, I take it to be a highly questionable move to justify the discovery of
WNC with personal, retrospective judgements by a few individuals. Even if we could
take these judgements for granted, this would be a long way from having shown that
WNC were accepted by the majority within the scientific community, which we
would expect if an effect was said to be firmly established. Galison even concedes
that “certainly no one moment can be pointed to either in E1A [i.e. the experiment by
the HPWF group] or in Gargamelle that could be called the instant of discovery”
(p. 506). In fact, it turns out that the blunt claims Galison finds in informal
memorandums and recollections by some protagonists in interviews about 6 years
after publication, are not at all mirrored in the original publications, which Galison
presents as having effectively discovered neutral currents. The abstract of the final
paper published in April 1974 by the HPWF group 1974 reads:
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A possible, but by no means unique, interpretation of this effect [muonless
events] is the existence of a neutral weak current
(Benvenuti. et al. 1974, p. 800; my emphasis).
The HPWF group concluded this paper by pointing out – rather hesitantly – that their
“measurement is not in disagreement with the Weinberg model […]” (ibid., p 803).
Still, the door was by no means shut to other interpretations, in spite of the similar
findings of the Gargamelle group at CERN:
Muonless events have also been reported in an experiment done at CERN at
much lower neutrino energies. However, other origins of the effect we
observe cannot as yet be excluded (ibid; emphasis added)
The Gargamelle group concluded in their “discovery” paper quite clearly:
It has to be emphasized that the neutral current hypothesis is not the only
interpretation of the observed events (Hasert et al. 1974, p. 20; added
emphasis).
Likewise, the November 1973 issue of Physics Today concluded that
Although both groups [Gargamelle and HPWF] suggest that they may be
seeing neutral currents, they also offer alternative explanations. And many
experimenters are sceptical that either group has demonstrated the existence
of neutral currents. (Lubkin 1973, p. 17)35
The scepticism of the research community, as we saw, primarily sprang from the—
according to Hammond in Nature—weakest point of the discovery claim, i.e. the
Monte Carlo programme with its numerous assumptions. But even if one wanted to
take the Monte Carlo calculations as granted without questioning them, the
observations of the HPWF group did not actually confirm the Salam-Weinberg model
and the observations of the Gargamelle group were far below the currently accepted
value, as Perkins (1997) pointed out (see also Fig. 12):
It is interesting to not that the HPWF result is actually inconsistent with the
Salam-Weinberg theory, while the Gargamelle result shows a value of R [i.e.,
NC/CC] that is only about two-thirds of the present-day value […]. The value
deduced for sin2θW = 0.38 ± 0.009 has to be compared with the present value
of 0.23. (Perkins 1997, p. 442)
In other words, whereas the Gargamelle results were not at all accurate when
compared to currently accepted values, the HPWF results were even inconsistent with
the latter.
35 Lubkin, G. B. (1973), Physics Today, vol. 26, November, 17, pp 19-17.
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So it appears that the experiments, which Galison in his account makes look
unequivocal, are actually far from it. There also appears to be no difference in
principle between the evidence and the arguments, which led to the “discovery event”
in the 1970s and those which did not in the 1960s. Even the evidence which the 1973
and 1974 papers by the Gargamelle and the HPWF groups cited for the existence of
neutral currents was subject to doubt and open to counter-arguments. So contrary to
Galison, the experiments did not quite so obviously “end” with the Gargamelle 1973
and the HWPF 1974 papers in the sense of WNC being firmly established.
Furthermore, we cannot even say why WNC experiments should have ended where
Galison wants them to end. The end in Galison’s story seems to be rather arbitrary. In
Galison’s story we encounter many arguments and a few instances of evidential
support or lack of support, where Galison’s story could have ended. At one instance
Galison even explicitly says that the HPWF group “seemed to have reached the end of
a difficult series of experiments” but then titles his next section with “dismanteling of
an ending” and describes how the HPWF group decided that they had not observed
neutral currents (1987, p. 223; see Section 4.1 for details). None of the arguments or
any of the evidence, which Galison considers, appear to be inherently capable of
putting a stop to the debates about the presence or absence of WNC.
Fig. 12: Comparison of the
results of the main Neutral
Current experiments.
The figure shows the results
obtained from Gargamelle and
HPWF as compared to the




Pickering shrewdly remarks that Galison appears to have “the knack of
describing the last persuasive argument in a controversy as being so persuasive as to
be, actually, unarguable” and points out that the “literary undoing of all persuasive
arguments except the last one goes unjustified in the text and adds nothing to our
understanding of how experiments end” (Pickering 1988, p. 472; emphasis mine). In
fact there was no difference between the arguments leading to an alleged end of
experiment those which did not result in the establishment of WNC: the amount of
neutral current events always critically depended on neutron background estimate.
This did not change at any point throughout the efforts made by the HPWF and the
Gargamelle group for establishing WNC as genuine phenomenon. Moreover, even if
the arguments Galison quotes as leading to the discovery had been different from
those arguments that did not and if those arguments were capable of putting a stop to
the experiments, Galison does not provide any analytical tools for detecting such
arguments, let alone for locating an end of experiments.
The fact that Galison talks much about “constraints” does not change anything
about this assessment. As Pickering (1995) has noted, Galison is not very explicit
about what he means by constraints, with the most explicit statement being: “I want to
use the notion of constraint the way historians often do – to designate obstacles that
while restrictive are not absolutely rigid” (1987, p. 47). The concept of constraint
allows Galison to adopt some form of middle ground: although nature did not force
scientists to accept the existence of WNC, it did nevertheless somehow compel
scientists to do so. In fact, the concept of constraint possesses almost magical features.
If scientists discover a new phenomenon, Galison can tell a story where scientists
were “constrained” in their practice towards this discovery. On the other hand, if
scientists failed to discover anything, then Galison can claim that there were no
constraints present or that they were simply too weak. It is then questionable what sort
of work the concept of constraint does for us in terms of us gaining a better
understanding of any historical episode.
Furthermore, one might want to become a bit more concrete and ask, what
really were the constraints in the discovery of neutral currents? “Instruments, specific
devices, theories, models (phenomenological) laws, unification, and individual runs”,
one reads rather puzzlingly (Galison 1987, p. 254). One then has to wonder how all
these entities managed such constraining. But perhaps, they did not. It rather seems
that Galison story could have done without any constraint-talk whatsoever without
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losing any of its content, with the reason being that Galison’s account is just a
descriptive story; not an explanation36. We therefore—contrary to Galison’s claims—
do not understand why the experiments ended (if they actually did)37.
Still, despite the conclusions reached above and rather paradoxically, the 1973
experiment by the Gargamelle group and the 1974 experiment by the HPWF group
are nowadays indeed quoted as “discoveries” (e.g. Weinberg 1980, p. 518)38. How can
that be? There is then an interesting question as to what Pickering called the
“openness” and “closure” of experimental systems (see e.g. Pickering 1983, p. 6). A
closed experimental system is perfectly understood and rules out every conceivable
error and background noise. An open experimental system, instead, is a system which
is imperfectly understood and thus always open to criticism and different
interpretations. According to Pickering closed systems are only to be found in science
textbooks but not in the lab or in actual scientific practice. In actual scientific practice,
closed experimental systems are never possible:
Experimenters do their best, of course, to eliminate all possible sources of
background, but it is a commonplace of experimental science that this process
has to stop somewhere if results are ever to be presented. Again, a judgement
36 For a more explicit characterisation of constraints see Weinert (1999). Weinert illustrates
his notion of constraints with an example from early atomic physics. J.J. Thomson’s plum
pudding model became untenable because of Rutherford’s scattering experiments. In the
language of constraints, Rutherford’s model constrained the conceptual space of possible
atomic models. And yet, it is rather unclear why we cannot talk of a clear refutation of
Thomson’s model. Constraints seem to be too weak for accounting for this historical episode.
37 Galison explains that he does not see the task of historians to “produce rational rules for
discovery”, which – he informs us – is “a favourite philosophical pastime” (p. 277). The task
of the historian is rather to “capture the building up of a persuasive argument about the world
around us, even in the absence of the logician’s certainty” (ibid.). Yet, as the discussion of
this paper shows, the pervasiveness of the arguments Galison cites in his work obviously
seem to be relative and apparently not sufficient for making a discovery claim. It should
perhaps also be noted that Galison’s characterisation of philosopher’s “favourite pastime” is
more of a caricature than anything else. On the contrary, in the “early days” philosophers of
science used to ban discoveries from analytical analysis due to their complexity. Although
philosophers long ago gave up on the context of discovery/justification distinction, and
although they have tried to make sense of discoveries, they have certainly not given
themselves to the illusion that there were “rational rules for discovery”, as Galison contends.
38 Rather naively Weinberg states that “as everyone knows, neutral currents were finally
discovered in 1973” (Weinberg mentions the simultaneous discovery by the HPWF group in a
footnote). This is a good example of distorted retrospective history produced by scientists.
See the locus classicus Kuhn (1996) for details.
36
is required, that enough has been done by the experimenters to make it
probable that background effects cannot explain the reported signal, and such
judgements can always, in principle, be called into question. (ibid., p. 6;
original emphasis)
These judgments do not figure in textbook accounts. Rather, Pickering suggests,
scientists identify their theoretical constructs with “the contents of nature” and “then
use this identification retrospectively to legitimate and make unproblematic existing
scientific judgements” (ibid., p. 7) 39. In the case of the discovery of weak neutral
currents that means that
[T]he experiments which discovered the weak neutral current are now
represented in the scientist’s account [and in Galison’s for that matter] as
closed systems just because the neutral current is seen to be real. Conversely,
other observation reports which were once taken to imply the non-existence
of the neutral current are now represented as being erroneous: clearly, if one
accepts the reality of the neutral current, this must be the case. (p. 7)
I entirely agree with this assessment. Likewise, I agree with Pickering that, yes, real
experimental systems (not the idealised ones to be found in textbooks) are always
open systems. And although, yes, a judgement is required in principle that enough has
been done, I believe that such judgements are never made in actual scientific practice.
More likely I hold to be the view that debates about experimental systems simply fade
out, when both or either of the following two conditions is met: a) the adopted
concept (here: neutral currents) proves to be viable in other experimental contexts,
and b) it is necessitated by a theory. The latter we of course observed with the
discovery of neutral currents.
7 EPISTEMIC WARRANT FROM TOP-DOWN
Throughout this section we saw that the active search for neutral currents, on a very
basic level, induced experimentalists to change their experimental apparatus (HPWF
trigger), and their data analysis (exclusive vs. inclusive currents, “energy cutting”
procedure). In the words of A. Rousset:
39 This is how Pickering’s paper title ‘Against Putting the Phenomena First’ (1984) derives. It
is against the habit of ‘using phenomena to explain scientific practice’ in order to ‘ask why
one scientist succeeded in observing some historically-accepted phenomenon while others
failed’ (p. 86).
37
If the theoreticians didn’t urge the experimentalists on the search of weak
neutral currents, the NC candidates would perhaps remain in the scanning
books. (ibid., p. 348)
This appears to be rather incompatible with Bogen and Woodward’s account of the
bottom-up construction of scientific phenomena according to which the theory
predicting the phenomena should neither bear on the production nor the analysis of
the data (see Fig. 1 on page 5). We also saw that the neutron background could not be
observed but had to be estimated, and that this estimate directly determined the
“strength” of the neutral current signal. Those estimates, arrived at by means of the
Monte Carlo simulations, are challengeable in principle and actually were challenged.
So surely, contrary to Bogen and Woodward (and the New Experimentalists)
experimental practice on itself was not capable of delivering enough warrant for
strong belief in the phenomenon of neutral currents. At least part of the warrant must
have come from somewhere else than from experimental practice. This is nicely
illustrated by another quote by Rousset, who, some 20 years after the “discovery”,
wondered why nobody among Gargamelle’s critics had asked an even more
fundamental question than just putting into doubt the cascade calculations:
What is finally more surprising is the fact that nobody asked a more basic
question on the Gargamelle collaboration results. Which proof can we give
that the only interpretation of the NC selected events is the existence of the
weak neutral currents? Even that [sic; viz. “if”] the NC candidates are
definitively not neutron interactions, is it demonstrated [with certainty] that
there are neutrino reactions? […] The interpretation as weak neutral current
interactions of neutrino is the most plausible, but it results mainly from a
theoretical prejudice. […] It is astonishing that this weakness of the
argumentation was not exploited to criticize the Gargamelle experiment with
a stronger argument than the unfair criticisms [focussing] on the neutron
background. (Rousset 1994, p. 349)
In other words, if we want to follow Rousset, the commitment to the existence of
neutral currents was essential to the discovery claims about neutral currents. Where
did this commitment to weak neutral currents come from? The answer is provided by
the Weinberg-Salam model.
In the early and mid-1960s weak neutral lepton currents were known of only
through analogy with charged lepton currents (cf. Fig. 5) and were regarded as
virtually non-existent40. Neither charged nor neutral lepton currents were observed,
40 See Galison (1987). See also e.g. Lee and Yang (1960), “Theoretical Discussion on
Possible High-Energy Neutrino Experiments”, Physical Review Letters, 4, 307-377.
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nor were they expected to be observed since their cross-sections41 were very small.
Even though the Weinberg-Salam model42 of electroweak interactions first only made
predictions about lepton currents, shortly after its proposal it was extended to neutral
hadron currents for which it predicted the same order of magnitude as for charged
hadron currents. In this respect the predictions of the W-S model differed
considerably from the predictions of the then accepted V-A theory of weak
interactions. Neutral currents therefore were crucial for deciding between the then
accepted V-A theory43 and the newly proposed W-S model. However, the W-S model
did not attract much attention, until it was renormalized by t’Hooft in November 1972
(see Koester et al. 1982). This made the W-S model reasonably predictive, because it
rendered its inherently infinite predictions finite44. Still, the model was in severe
mismatch with the experimental data. Weak neutral currents had not been observed.
Although the so-called GIM mechanism (after its inventors Glashow, Iliopoulos and
Maiani) saved the W-S model against refutation from strangeness45 changing neutral
current by positing a fourth ‘charmed’ quark, the mismatch between theory and
experiment remained for strangeness conserving neutral currents46. A whole industry
of model building emerged, which tried to save the unificatory benefits of the W-S
model whilst at the same time accommodating the fact that neutral currents were not
observed (see Pickering 1983, p. 186; Koester et al. 1982)47. The problem with these
theories was that the price for the annihilation of neutral currents was the introduction
of new particles (neutral/charged heavy leptons). Pickering notes that “[t]heorists
41 Cf. footnote 21.
42 The W-S model is now also known as the “standard model” and was independently
proposed by Weinberg (1967) and Salam (1967).
43 This theory was developed by Feynman and Gell-Mann (1958), “Theory of Fermi
Interaction”, Physical Review, p. 109, p. 193-198.
44 The W-S model (or theory) is a gauge theory, a particular kind of quantum field theory.
Solutions to Quantum field theories are not exact but need to be approximated by perturbation
series. For higher order approximations these series lead to infinite results. Recognising that
only a small number of distinct types of infinites occur allows one to substitute those types by
measured values. This step is known as ‘renormalisation’.
45 Strangeness is a property of particles for describing decay of particles in strong and electro-
magnetic reactions.
46 Although the GIM mechanism was used to save the W-S model, it was originally devised to
account for the kaon-day anomaly. For details see Pickering (1983, pp. 180-1).
47 One here is strongly reminded of Thomas S. Kuhn’s assertion of the proliferation of
theories in the response to anomalies.
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found themselves articulating models referring to phenomena which seemed to have
no experimental counterparts” (Pickering 1983, p. 186). This mismatch was finally
corrected with the discovery of weak neutral currents by the HPWF and the
Gargamelle groups, clearly favouring the W-S model over its “neutral-current-free”
rivals.
Pickering suggests that there exists some sort of symbiosis between theoretical
and experimental practice in the sense of a mutual dependency. If this symbiosis is
somehow broken up, i.e. if the match between theoretical and experimental practice is
lost, scientists will do anything they can to regain this symbiosis. Pickering has
interpreted this symbiosis in socio-economic terms. He has claimed that WNC were a
‘socially desirable phenomenon’ (ibid., p. 109) and that ‘particle physicists accepted
the existence of the neutral current because they could see how to ply their trade more
profitably in a world in which the neutral current was real’ (ibid., p. 87; my
emphasis)48. However, even though I agree with many of the points Pickering makes
about the discovery of WNC, I do not think that one needs to resort to any such socio-
economic arguments. Even if one were to reject all sociological arguments as being
irrelevant to the discovery of WNC, from the discussion of this paper it should have
become very obvious that the evidence itself (despite being present already in the
1960s, as we saw) was insufficient for convincing physicists of the existence of WNC.
I suggest that it was the W-S model that made the existence of WNC plausible,
because it required the existence of WNC49. Apart from the available data, it was this
epistemic warrant from the “top-down”, as it were, which gave physicists enough
confidence in the existence of WNC. Hence the W-S model provided an epistemic
warrant without which WNC might never have been discovered. This claim comes in
a weak and a strong version. According to the weak version, there would have been
no motivation for the active search of neutral currents—involving the change of
apparatus and changes in the data analysis procedure. According to the stronger
version, without the W-S model the gathered evidence would itself not have been
48 Pickering has received much criticism for this statement (see e.g. Franklin 1986, 1990,
2002).
49 It should be noted that the WS model was not just any model but one that had certain
valuable features. It unified the phenomena and it was, in contrast to its competitors, a
somewhat elegant theory.
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strong enough to warrant belief in the existence of neutral currents. On the basis of the
discussion of this paper I am prepared to embrace both claims.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper an attempt was made to shed some light on the problem of discerning a
physical effect or phenomenon from noise by considering the discovery of Weak
Neutral Currents (WNC). Incidentally, it is this discovery that has frequently been
cited by extant philosophical accounts of effect-noise discrimination. Bogen and
Woodward (1988), for instance, have claimed in general, and in the case of the
discovery of WNC in particular, that phenomena are inferred from data without the
involvement of the causal theory that seeks to explain either the data or the
phenomenon in question. According to them, inferring phenomena from data is
entirely extraneous to any explanatory enterprises and merely requires the application
of various well-established experimental procedures like data reduction, statistical
arguments etc. The latter have been particularly emphasised by the other
philosophical account of effect-noise discrimination, which has made heavy use of the
discovery of WNC (Mayo 1994, 1996). I have argued against those two views by, on
the one hand, criticising statistical arguments as being insufficient for the
establishment of genuine effects (particularly pace Mayo and to some extent pace
Bogen and Woodward) and on the other hand by showing that, contrary to Bogen and
Woodward, the higher level physical theory (here: the Weinberg-Salam model of
electroweak interaction) explaining the phenomena (here: WNC) did bear on the data
analysis and production (here: bubble and spark chamber photographs). In Section 3.1
this paper I argued for the limited role of statistical arguments by referring to those
experiments (i.e. bubble chamber experiments) which are less susceptible to statistical
arguments than spark chamber experiments (which Mayo quotes exclusively) simply
because they produce a smaller amount of data (but data of a higher “resolution”). In
particular, it was a single bubble chamber picture (the so-called “Aachen picture”),
which “sealed the deal” for many physicists who were involved in the WNC
experiments, i.e. this single picture gave them enough epistemic warrant for believing
in the existence of WNC.
More severely, none of these philosophical accounts of effect-noise
discrimination can accommodate Pickering’s observation that the data analysis by the
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HPWF and the Gargamelle group changed considerably from the 1960s to the 1970s,
from when WNC were taken to be practically inexistent to when discovery claims
about WNCs were made. Pickering has argued that the 1960s experiments were
already capable of discovering WNC in principle. This assessment has been
confirmed in the present paper (Section 4) against claims to the contrary (Miller and
Bullock 1994). In the 1960s the HPWF experiments used a trigger, which recorded
muon-ful events only. This changed in the 1970s when Weinberg had given the
experimenters some theoretical motivation (in the form of the WS model postulating
WNC) for taking into consideration muon-less events (i.e. WNC candidates) by
allowing the trigger to record such events. Quite obviously, the experimental
apparatus of the 1960s itself was well capable of detecting a WNC signal. The only
thing that did change was the willingness of the experimenters to detect such a signal.
This change is not explicable by any statistical arguments. And quite clearly the
theoretical predictions of the phenomena did bear on the data production—very much
contrary to Bogen and Woodward. In the case of the bubble chamber experiments,
Miller and Bullock (1994) have alleged that the argument from spatial distribution,
discussed in Section 5, could have not been possibly made in the pre-Gargamelle
bubble chambers. This is simply incorrect. Moreover, even if Miller and Bullock were
right, the argument from spatial distribution was rendered invalid by neutron
cascades, as Haidt and Fry pointed out. In none of the historical and philosophical
accounts of the discovery of WNC, this point has received due recognition. This was
corrected in the current paper. In this paper, we even saw evidence that data indicating
the existence of WNC were already present in the 1960s and that those data obviously
had been overlooked by the researches involved in the experiments at the time.
Contrary to Galison in particular, who has given the impression that the
discovery of WNC was the result of many different lines of arguments, I have
emphasised in Section 5.1 that any discovery claim critically depended on the Monte
Carlo estimates. Since WNC cannot be observed but only estimated in relation to
neutron background from which they are observationally indistinguishable, a lower
estimate of neutron background automatically entails a higher number of WNC
events. As a consequence of the vulnerability of the Monte Carlo estimates, no real
end of the WNC experiments can be located in the original literature—very much
contrary to Galison (Section 6). Even if there was such an end, I have argued, Galison
does not provide any analytical tools for identifying such an end. More seriously—
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again contrary to Galison—there seems to be no sufficiently compelling epistemic
appeal to originate from either any arguments devised in the experimental chase for
WNC, nor from the evidence itself. Still, we take WNC to have been established and
discovered. In contrast to Pickering, I have argued that the reasons for the discovery
claim are not to be sought in sociological factors but rather in reasons to do with the
theory at issue (Section 7). Neutral currents were discovered not only because there
was sufficient evidence for them (and as I have shown there was sufficient evidence
for WNC long before a discovery claim was made), but also because the Salam-
Weinberg model required them. I called this the epistemic warrant from top-down.
What are the more general lessons to be learned from this case? Is it reasonable to
think that the strength of a particular physical effect is always going to be as critically
determined by the estimation of background noise as in the case of the discovery of
WNC? Should we be prepared to accept that experimental techniques and the data
produced by them are never going to be sufficient for effect discrimination and
(occasionally) the corresponding discovery claim? May the discovery of WNC not
just be an extreme case without much import for our notion of effect discrimination?
Of course, this might indeed be so. It is an empirical question as to how general the
conclusions of this paper are really going to be, and it will require further studies of
signal discrimination in other domains of science. However, there are indications that
the conclusions of this paper will stand for a number of cases. Thus far, the discovery
of WNC was taken to be (particularly by Bogen & Woodward, Mayo, and Galison)
the paradigm case for low level, experimentally-driven discrimination of noise and
physical effect. It is then rather telling that precisely this paradigm case obviously
does not fit the scheme of the ‘bottom up’ construction of phenomena, which has
most clearly been articulated by Bogen and Woodward but which has much in
common with the central tenets of New Experimentalism. Furthermore, I do think that
it is reasonable to assume that physical effects will never occur in isolation and on
their own (as much as we desire this and as much as we try to achieve this50) but
rather will always be accompanied by other ‘unwanted’, ‘intervening’ or
‘background’ effects51. Therefore a claim about the amount and constitution of a
50 See Cartwright (1983), Chapter 3, for an illuminating discussion of this point.
51 There is also a story to be told about what sorts of effects are going to count as ‘interesting’
or ‘uninteresting’, ‘wanted’ or ‘unwanted’, ‘relevant’ or ‘irrelevant’, ‘genuine’ or ‘false’. It is
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particular effect will naturally also have to say something about those other effects,
which are held to be different from the effect in question. There will thus most likely
be a critical dependency relationship between claims about a particular effect and
claims about the extent of ‘noise’, very much in accord with the conclusions reached
about WNC in this paper.
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